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Asset Liquidity and Stock Liquidity: International Evidence 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 countries. 
In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that firms with greater asset liquidity 
on average have higher stock liquidity. More importantly, our study shows that asset liquidity 
plays a more significant role in resolving valuation uncertainty in countries with poor 
information environment. For example, we find that the asset-stock liquidity relation is stronger 
in countries with poor accounting standards. We further find some evidence that after the 
adoption of IFRS, the improved accounting information environment results in a weaker asset-
stock liquidity relation, but only in countries with a strong legal regime. Finally, our study shows 
that the positive asset-stock liquidity relation may be attributed to transparency and/or liquidity 
reasons. 
 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15, G32, M41, M48, F30 
Keywords: Stock Liquidity, Asset Liquidity, IFRS, Transparency, Cash Holdings 
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1. Introduction 
 We study two important issues relating to the asset liquidity and stock liquidity relation. 
First, in an international setting, we examine the asset liquidity and stock liquidity relation under 
different accounting information environments. Then, we examine both the transparency and 
liquidity effects associated with the asset liquidity and stock liquidity relation.   
 Gopalan et al. (2012) present two competing hypotheses for the relation between asset 
liquidity and stock liquidity. The valuation uncertainty hypothesis predicts a positive relation 
between asset liquidity and stock liquidity, while the utilization uncertainty hypothesis predicts a 
negative relation. Under the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, liquid assets are easier to value 
than non-liquid assets. Firms with greater asset liquidity are associated with lower valuation 
uncertainty and, therefore, have higher stock liquidity. Under the utilization uncertainty 
hypothesis, higher cash holdings imply more investments and hence greater uncertainty over the 
value of future assets. Moreover, there is also a danger that the cash may be invested in negative 
NPV projects or expropriated by managers due to agency problems. Thus, firms holding higher 
cash and other liquid assets have higher utilization uncertainty and will have lower stock 
liquidity. The actual relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity is an empirical issue. 
While Gopalan et al. (2012) find a positive relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity in 
the U.S. equity market, our study tests the above competing (but not mutually exclusive) 
hypotheses in an international setting, which allows for additional insights not explicitly covered 
in their model.  We find a positive relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 
international capital markets. We attempt to provide further insights on the valuation uncertainty 
hypothesis by examining the asset and stock liquidity relation under different accounting 
information environments. Lang et al. (2012) argue that firm-level transparency matters more in 
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countries with greater overall information opacity, i.e., where the demand for information is 
greater. From an asset transparency perspective, cash and other liquid assets are less opaque and 
easier to value than other assets because of lower information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 
2000; Kothari et al., 2002). Firm-level transparency is therefore higher for firms with greater 
asset liquidity. Investors are more reliant on the firm’s asset liquidity (transparency) to value the 
firm in the face of weaker accounting standards.
1
 In other words, the valuation uncertainty 
hypothesis posits a stronger asset-stock liquidity relation in countries with weak accounting 
standards. In contrast, the utilization uncertainty hypothesis posits a weaker asset-stock liquidity 
relation in countries with weak accounting standards. In a more opaque information environment, 
an entrenched manager can easily abuse the firms’ cash holdings and result in higher utilization 
uncertainty for the firm’s cash holdings. 
In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that the asset-stock liquidity 
relation is stronger in countries with poor accounting standards. This finding indicates that firm-
level asset liquidity (transparency) plays a more prominent role in resolving the valuation 
uncertainty when the accounting information environment is poor. We examine the asset and 
stock liquidity relation across 47 countries around the world. The sample consists of 16,370 
unique firms and covers the period of 1996 to 2010, resulting in 127,982 firm-year observations. 
The dependent variable in our multivariate regressions is stock liquidity. We employ the Zero 
Proportion
2
 of Lesmond et al. (1999) and define our stock liquidity measure as (1 – Zero 
Proportion).  
                                                 
1
 Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004), similarly, argue that firm-level corporate governance 
provisions play a more important role in alleviating the negative effects of ineffective legal framework when 
regulation is weak. 
2
 The Zero Proportion of a stock is a measure of illiquidity which is equal to the proportion of trading days with zero 
returns to total trading days in a given year. 
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The primary independent variable of interest is asset liquidity. Our measures of asset 
liquidity are similar to those in Gopalan et al. (2012). To construct the asset liquidity measures, 
we first rank a firm’s assets based on their degree of liquidity and assign a liquidity score 
between zero and one to each asset class. We then compute a weighted average of the liquidity 
scores across the different asset classes for each firm. The weights are based on the proportion of 
each asset class scaled by the lagged value of total assets. Depending on the liquidity scores 
assigned to each asset class in the initial step, this methodology yields three alternative measures 
of asset liquidity for each firm. 
In a separate analysis, we examine the effects of a change of accounting information 
environment on the asset and stock liquidity relation. We investigate the structural changes in the 
asset-stock liquidity relation around the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) across the 47 countries. A number of studies (Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 
2011; Horton et al., 2013; Tan et al. 2011) conclude that the adoption of IFRS improves the 
information environment and produced positive market-based benefits, such as higher stock 
liquidity. However, a more recent study (Christensen et al., 2013a) finds that the liquidity 
benefits around the introduction of IFRS are mostly attributed to changes in the reporting 
enforcement, rather than the change in accounting standards per se
3
. Nevertheless, what is 
important in this study is that both events surrounding the adoption of IFRS lead to an 
improvement in the accounting information environment.   
 Using the adoption of IFRS as an exogenous context, we test the effect of information 
environments on the asset-stock liquidity relation. Under the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, 
we expect the asset-stock liquidity relation to be weaker following the adoption of IFRS. 
                                                 
3
 We conduct a test using the five EU countries that made substantive changes in enforcement concurrent with the 
introduction of IFRS (Christensen et al., 2013a). The result is qualitatively similar but less significant compare to 
those countries with strong legal regime. 
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Following Lang et al.’s (2012) argument, the improved accounting information environment in 
the post-IFRS period reduces the importance of firm-level asset liquidity (transparency). The 
higher quality of information disclosure following the IFRS should prompt investors to rely less 
on asset liquidity (transparency) in firm valuation. In contrast, the asset-stock liquidity relation is 
expected to be stronger post-IFRS under the utilization uncertainty hypothesis. An improved 
information environment reduces asymmetric information and makes it harder for managers to 
abuse the firm’s cash holdings. In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find some 
evidence that the improved accounting information environment in the post-IFRS period results 
in a weaker asset-stock liquidity relation, but the weaker asset-stock liquidity relation occurs 
only in countries with a strong legal regime. This finding suggests that the quality of the 
information environment depend on the quality of enforcement of those standards. 
 To check the robustness of our results, we further examine the asset and stock liquidity 
relation under different legal regimes. Contrary to the utilization uncertainty hypothesis, the 
asset-stock liquidity relation is stronger in countries with a weak legal regime. We also use the 
bid-ask spread as an alternative measure of liquidity. The asset-stock liquidity relation is 
inconclusive when using the bid-ask spread. One possible reason for this result may be because 
of the reduction in sample size. In comparison to our original sample size of 127,982, the number 
of firm-year observations for the bid-ask spread sample drops to 91,251. In fact, two countries 
entirely drop out from the sample due to data limitations. Another possible reason is that the 
Zero Proportion may be better than the bid-ask spread for studying stock liquidity, especially in 
international capital markets. Studies supporting this argument consist of Lesmond et al. (1999), 
Lesmond (2005), and Bekaert et al. (2007), which conclude that the Zero Proportion is better at 
capturing priced liquidity than a variety of other measures. Lang et al. (2012) also support the 
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argument, stating that “the bid-ask spreads speak more directly to transaction costs, while zero-
return days measure liquidity more directly and are available for a wider sample of firms.”  
 Finally, we examine the transparency and liquidity effects on the asset-stock liquidity 
relation. The positive asset-stock liquidity relation may be attributed to two possible effects. First, 
liquid assets, such as cash, are more transparent than others. They are easier to value because 
they have less information asymmetry. Therefore, firms with a higher proportion of cash and 
other liquid assets are more transparent and would have higher stock liquidity. Second, the 
positive relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity may be due to a liquidity effect. 
Higher asset liquidity reduces the firm’s operating risks and investment uncertainty. Firms with 
higher asset liquidity are expected to have lower valuation uncertainty and hence higher stock 
liquidity. 
 To study the transparency and liquidity effects associated with the positive asset-stock 
liquidity relation, we examine the effect of individual balance sheet (Cash, Current Assets, Fixed 
Asset, and Intangible Assets) items on stock liquidity. We find that stock liquidity is positively 
related to both the firm’s cash holdings and intangible assets. The positive relation between cash 
holdings and stock liquidity may be due to transparency and/or liquidity reasons. Cash and its 
equivalents are both significantly less opaque and more liquid than other assets. In contrast, 
intangible assets are relatively illiquid. Although intangible assets are more difficult to value than 
other assets, the accounting recognition and disclosure of such assets actually enhance the 
transparency of firms. Thus, any significant relation that intangible assets have with stock 
liquidity is largely attributed to transparency reasons rather than liquidity reasons. We also find a 
significant positive relation between non-cash current assets and stock liquidity. There is no 
statistically significant relation between fixed assets and stock liquidity.  
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 To further distinguish the transparency effect from the liquidity effect, we also examine 
the respective balance sheet item’s relation with stock liquidity under different accounting 
information environments and under financially constrained firms. The cash-stock liquidity 
relation is significantly stronger firms in countries with weak accounting standards or those with 
financial constraints. In contrast, the intangible assets-stock liquidity relation is only stronger in 
countries with weak accounting standards. Our findings suggest that the both transparency and 
liquidity effects drive the cash-stock liquidity relation; while only the transparency effect drives 
the intangible assets-stock liquidity relation. The findings for the non-cash current assets and 
stock liquidity relation and the fixed assets and stock liquidity relation under the above two 
settings are mixed and inconclusive. 
This paper contributes to the study on the link between a firm’s physical assets structure 
and its market microstructure. First, extending upon Gopalan et al.’s (2012) empirical findings in 
the U.S., we provide international evidence on the positive relation between asset liquidity and 
stock liquidity across 47 countries. Moreover, we examine the asset liquidity and stock liquidity 
relation under different accounting information and legal environments. We provide important 
insights on the role that cash and other liquid assets play in resolving valuation uncertainty and 
find that investors rely more on a firm’s asset liquidity to value the firm in countries with  poor 
accounting information environment. In the other words, the link between asset liquidity and 
stock liquidity weakens with the improvement in accounting standards. Overall, our findings 
indicate that the accounting information environment is an important determinant of the asset-
stock liquidity relation.  
Second, our study is related to previous studies (Healy et al., 1999; Lang et al., 2012; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Welker, 1995) on the relation between firm transparency and stock 
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liquidity. Lang et al. (2012) find a positive relation between firm transparency (as measured by 
earnings management, accounting standards, auditor quality, number of analyst following, and 
accuracy of analyst forecasts) and stock liquidity across 46 countries. Other studies (Healy et al., 
1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Welker, 1995) find that better firm disclosures lead to higher 
stock liquidity. However, the firm’s overall transparency also depends on the transparency of its 
asset structure. Thus, unlike previous studies, our study focuses on the direct relation between 
asset transparency and stock liquidity.  
More importantly, our study also differs from previous studies on firm transparency 
because the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity may not be attributable to the 
transparency reason alone. There is a liquidity effect as well. For example, our study shows that 
the cash-stock liquidity relation is driven by both transparency and liquidity effects; while the 
intangible assets-stock liquidity relation is driven by transparency effect only.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection. Section 4 provides international 
evidence on the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Section 5 examines the asset-
stock liquidity relation under different accounting information environments. We conduct further 
robustness checks in Section 6. Section 7 examines individual balance sheet (Cash, Current 
Assets, Fixed Asset, and Intangible Assets) item’s relation with stock liquidity. Section 8 
concludes the study. 
 
2.  Hypotheses Development 
 In this study, we examine the following competing hypotheses on the relation between 
asset liquidity and stock liquidity: 
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H10:  The stock liquidity of a firm is positively correlated to its asset liquidity 
(Valuation Uncertainty Hypothesis). 
 
H1a:  The stock liquidity of a firm is negatively correlated to its asset liquidity 
(Utilization Uncertainty Hypothesis). 
 
 In Gopalan et al.’s (2012) model, the firm’s assets comprise cash, an existing illiquid 
project, and a growth option (new project). Hence, the key parameters that affect the overall 
variance of a firm’s value are the proportion of cash holdings (), variance of current project’s 
cash flows (εx), and variance of new project’s cash flows (εy). The managerial cash holdings and 
investment decisions then affect the volatility of firm value and, consequently, stock illiquidity 
as measured by Kyle's lambda.   
 Under the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, there are two reasons why liquid assets, such 
as cash, are positively associated with stock liquidity. First, from an asset transparency 
perspective, cash and other liquid assets are easier to value than other assets because of lower 
information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Kothari et al., 2002). In Gopalan et al.’s (2012) 
model, higher cash holdings are associated with lower volatility in the value of assets-in-place. 
Firms with a higher proportion of cash and other liquid assets are more transparent and, therefore, 
associated with higher stock liquidity.
4
 Second, the positive relation between asset liquidity and 
stock liquidity may also be due to a liquidity reason. Asset liquidity reduces the operating risks 
and the investment uncertainty of a firm (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009). For example, 
high cash holdings can help firms to avoid disruptions in operating activities that arise from 
                                                 
4
 The link between firm transparency and stock liquidity is also related to previous studies on firm disclosure policy 
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Healy et al., 1999; Lang et al., 2012; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Welker, 
1995). For example, Welker (1995), Healy et al. (1999), and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that better firm 
disclosure, which reduces information asymmetry between insiders and the public, leads to narrower bid-ask spread 
(higher stock liquidity). The firm’s overall transparency is not attributable to the firm’s disclosure policy per se, but 
it is also dependent on the transparency of the firm’s asset structure. Liquid assets, such as cash and its equivalents, 
are less opaque than other assets. 
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shortfalls in sales and cash flows. High cash holdings also provide greater certainty on the 
funding and implementation of planned fixed asset investments. Thus, a benefit associated with 
higher asset liquidity is lower volatility in current project’s cash flows (εx).
5
 As a consequence, 
firms with a higher level of asset liquidity are expected to have lower valuation uncertainty and, 
hence, higher stock liquidity. Overall, both asset transparency and liquidity effects posit a 
positive relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity.  
 In contrast, the utilization uncertainty hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between 
asset and stock liquidity. The utilization uncertainty hypothesis focuses on the uncertainty 
pertaining to the usage and redeployment of liquid assets. Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that a 
downside to liquid assets is that cash and other liquid assets can be easily redeployed or even 
expropriated. In Gopalan et al.’s (2012) model, higher cash holdings also imply more 
investments.  The firm has greater uncertainty over future assets and, therefore, will have lower 
stock liquidity. There is thus a danger that the cash may be invested in negative NPV projects or 
expropriated through outright theft. The availability of excess cash also facilitates share 
repurchases, which can be potentially abused by managers with stock options to artificially drive 
up share prices. Lazonick (2008) documents some of the recent abuses of share repurchases by 
managers.
6
 
 In this study, we start by testing the two competing hypotheses. We do so by examining 
the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 countries. We also examine the 
relation between asset and stock liquidity under different accounting information environments. 
First, we examine the effect of cross-country variations in accounting standards on the asset and 
                                                 
5
 Gopalan et al. (2012) did not explicitly model the liquidity effect associated with a firm’s cash holdings per se. In 
their model, the variance of current project’s cash flows (εx) is assumed to be exogenous and independent of the 
firm’s cash holdings. 
6
 Lazonick, William, September 25, 2008, “Everyone is Paying Price for Share Buybacks,” Financial Times. 
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stock liquidity relation. Countries with weak accounting standards are generally associated with 
poor accounting information environment and also greater information asymmetry (Bushman et 
al., 2004). Gopalan et al. (2012) do not explicitly model the asset-stock liquidity relation under 
different accounting information environments, but Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and 
Love (2004) argue that firm-level corporate governance matters more in countries with a weak 
legal regime. Similarly, Lang et al. (2012) argue that firm-level transparency matters more in 
countries with greater overall information opacity, where the demand for information is greater. 
From an asset transparency perspective, cash and other liquid assets are more transparent and 
easier to value than other assets. Firm-level transparency is therefore higher for firms with 
greater asset liquidity. Investors are more reliant on the firm’s asset liquidity (transparency) 
structure to value the firm in countries with weak accounting standards. In the other words, the 
valuation uncertainty hypothesis posits a stronger asset-stock liquidity relation in countries with 
weak accounting standards.  
 In contrast, the utilization uncertainty hypothesis posits a weaker asset-stock liquidity 
relation in countries with lower accounting standards. A more opaque information environment 
is likely to enhance the entrenched manager’s ability to abuse the firms’ cash holdings. Agency 
problems are more serious in countries with weak accounting standards as the manager’s sub-
optimal and expropriation activities are less likely to be detected. The effect of different 
accounting standards on the asset-stock liquidity relation is summarized below:  
 
H20:  The relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity is stronger in countries 
with weak accounting standards (Valuation Uncertainty Hypothesis). 
 
H2a:  The relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity is weaker in countries with 
weak accounting standards (Utilization Uncertainty Hypothesis). 
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 Second, we examine the structural changes in the asset-stock liquidity relation around the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS across 47 countries. The adoption of IFRS around the world is 
probably one of the most important regulatory changes recently. IFRS is a set of uniform 
accounting and disclosure rules for corporate financial reporting that is developed by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The potential benefits from the adoption of 
IFRS include improved information comparability, increased reporting transparency, reduced 
information costs, and lessened information asymmetry (Ball, 2006; Choi and Meek, 2010). 
Some studies have shown that the adoption of IFRS resulted in an improvement in the 
information environment and produced positive market-based benefits such as higher stock 
liquidity, lower cost of capital, and greater analyst forecast accuracy (Byard et al., 2011; Daske 
et al., 2008; Horton et al., 2013). A more recent study by Christensen et al. (2013a), however, 
argues that the liquidity benefits around the introduction of IFRS are attributed mostly to changes 
in reporting enforcement, rather than the change in accounting standards per se. Regardless of 
the reasons behind the liquidity benefits, both the events surrounding the adoption of IFRS lead 
to an improvement in accounting information environment. 
 The events surrounding the mandatory adoption of IFRS thus represents an ideal 
exogenous context for us to study the effect that an improvement in accounting information 
environment has on the asset-stock liquidity relation. Following Lang et al.’s (2012) argument, 
the improved accounting information environment in the post-IFRS period is expected to reduce 
the importance of firm-level asset liquidity (transparency). As a consequence, investors are 
expected to rely less on the firm’s asset liquidity structure to resolve valuation uncertainty after 
the adoption of IFRS. In contrast, the asset-stock liquidity relation is expected to be stronger in 
the post-IFRS period under the utilization uncertainty hypothesis. Thus, the improved 
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information environment post-IFRS makes it harder for managers to abuse the firms’ cash 
holdings and, hence, result in lower utilization uncertainty for the firm’s cash holdings. The 
possible effects associated with the mandatory adoption of IFRS are summarized below:   
 
H30:  The relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity is weaker post-IFRS 
(Valuation Uncertainty Hypothesis). 
 
H3a:  The relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity is stronger post-IFRS 
(Utilization Uncertainty Hypothesis). 
 
Previous studies have shown that the implementation of IFRS and the quality of financial 
reports after the IFRS adoption depend on the countries’ legal regimes. As argued in Daske et al. 
(2013), countries with a strong legal regime are likely to be “serious” adopters of IFRS, while 
countries with a weak legal regime are likely to adopt IFRS in label only.  A more recent study 
by Christensen et al.’s (2013a) find that the liquidity benefits are limited mostly to five EU 
countries that made substantive changes in reporting enforcement concurrently with the 
introduction of IFRS. Hence, the liquidity effects in the post-IFRS period may be contingent on 
the countries’ legal regimes.  We test these effects in our international sample. 
  
3.  Sample and Data 
 This section describes the sample, the data, and the measures of stock liquidity and asset 
liquidity. A summary of the variables description and the data sources are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
3.1  Sample 
14 
 
 Our sample selection is based on the following procedures. We select firms from 
countries that are covered by both Datastream and Worldscope over the period of 1996 to 2010. 
To be included in the sample, the firms are required to have market and accounting information 
necessary for the computation of both the liquidity and control variables. Except for China and 
the U.S., we select the stocks from the major exchange of each country.
7
 We only include non-
financial primary-listing common stocks that are traded using the same currency as that of the 
listing country. Depository Receipts, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT), and preferred stocks 
are excluded from our sample. We remove non-common stocks that are wrongly labeled as 
common stocks by Datastream, using a comprehensive “name screening” list compiled by 
Griffin et al. (2009). Finally, we exclude penny stocks that are priced less than US$0.50 per 
share.
8
 The final sample consists of 127,982 firm-year observations for 16,370 unique firms 
across 47 countries. 
 
3.2  Stock Liquidity (LIQ) 
As documented in Lesmond et al. (1999), a common problem associated with the bid-ask 
spread measure for stock liquidity in studies on international capital markets is that the time-
series data on the bid-ask spread in international markets is either incomplete or of insufficient 
length. To mitigate the data availability problem for international markets, Lesmond et al. (1999) 
propose a stock illiquidity measure derived from daily stock returns. The stock illiquidity 
measure, called the Zero Proportion, is the proportion of trading days with zero returns to total 
trading days in a given year. The intuition is that arbitrageurs trade only if the value of 
accumulated information exceeds the marginal cost of trading. If trading costs are sizable, new 
                                                 
7
 Most countries have only one major exchange, except for the U.S. (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ) and China 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
8
 We also obtain similar results using US$1 per share as an alternate cut-off for filtering penny stocks.  
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information must accumulate for a period of time before investors engage in trading. Lesmond 
(2005) concludes that the Zero Proportion measure performs well in both within-country cross-
sectional and cross-country analyses. The Zero Proportion measure has also been validated in 
both the U.S. and international markets (Bekaert et al., 2007; Goyenko et al., 2009; Lesmond, 
2005). Since Zero Proportion is a measure of illiquidity, we take its complement expressed by 
Equation (1) as the measure of stock liquidity (LIQ) for our study.  
 
                              (1) 
 
The stock return data for calculating the stock liquidity (LIQ) measure is from 
Datastream. However, Ince and Porter (2006) caution about a possible data error in Datastream’s 
return index. To rectify the data error, we follow Ince and Porter’s (2006) recommendation and 
set the daily return index to be missing if any returns above 100% are reversed the next day, and 
set the monthly return index to be missing if any of the returns above 300% are reversed the 
following month.
9
 Another data problem is that Datastream fills the return index with the 
previous day’s data if the stock is either delisted or not traded. This practice produces erroneous 
zero returns after delisting dates and on non-trading days. To rectify this problem, we first follow 
Ince and Porter’s (2006) methodology for identifying delisted firms and their delisting dates. To 
identify the delisting date, we observe the most recent dates that produce non-zero return in 
reverse chronological order. The latest non-zero return date is treated as the delisting date. 
Second, following Lesmond et al.’s (1999) methodology, we classify non-trading dates for a 
specific exchange if 90% or more of the stocks have zero return on that date. Finally, all 
                                                 
9
 Returns are calculated from Datastream's Return Index (RI) data type using the following relation:  
rj,t = (RIj,t / RIt,t-1) – 1. Datastream’s RI assumes dividend reinvestment. 
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observations recorded on non-trading dates and after delisting dates are deleted to rectify the 
erroneous zero returns problem.  
The summary statistics for the stock liquidity (LIQ) measure are shown in Table 1. 
Overall, the mean and median stock liquidity (LIQ) for our sample are 82.3 and 92.7, 
respectively. On average, firms in the U.S., India, China, Italy, and South Korea have the highest 
stock liquidity while those in Sri Lanka, Chile, Indonesia, and Philippines have the lowest stock 
liquidity. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.3  Asset Liquidity 
 The main independent variable in our study is the asset liquidity measure. We follow 
Gopalan et al.’s (2012) methodology.10 For a given firm, we rank its asset classes based on their 
varying degree of liquidity and assign a liquidity score between zero and one to each of them. 
Second, we calculate a weighted average of the liquidity scores across the different asset classes 
for each firm. Depending on the liquidity scores assigned to each asset class in the first step, this 
methodology yields three alternative measures of weighted asset liquidity (WAL) score for each 
firm.  
For example, to compute the first measure of weighted asset liquidity (WAL1), we first 
assign a liquidity score of one to cash and cash equivalents
11
, and a score of zero to all other 
assets. We then calculate WAL1 as follows: 
                                                 
10
 This approach in measuring asset liquidity is in the same spirit as that of Berger and Bouwman (2009). 
11
 We recognize that there are differences in liquidity among the different type of cash held by a firm. For example, 
cash in the bank account is more liquid than investment in short-term government bonds. Furthermore, it is possible 
that a multinational firm keeps its cash offshore for tax purpose. The cash kept offshore has low liquidity compared 
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(2) 
The WAL1 measure is crude and assumes that assets other than cash have no liquidity.  
For the second weighted asset liquidity (WAL2) measure, we assign a liquidity score of one to 
cash and cash equivalents and 0.5 to non-cash current assets because non-cash current assets are 
the second most liquid assets after cash.  All other assets are assigned a score of zero. We 
calculate WAL2 as follows: 
         
                    
                 
      
              
                 
       
               
                 
     
 
(3) 
The third weighted asset liquidity (WAL3) measure looks further into long-lived assets. 
Long-lived assets can be classified into tangible and non-tangible assets. Tangible assets (such as 
property, plant, and equipment) are more liquid than non-tangible assets (such as goodwill). 
Following this liquidity hierarchy, we assign a liquidity score of one to cash and cash equivalents, 
0.75 to non-cash current assets, 0.5 to tangible fixed assets, and zero to non-tangible assets. We 
then compute WAL3 as follows: 
         
                    
                 
     
              
                 
        
              
                 
 
       
               
                 
     
(4) 
 The summary statistics for the above three asset liquidity measures are shown in Table 1. 
In terms of asset liquidity ranking, we find that, on average, firms in U.S., Ireland, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Norway have the highest asset liquidity while those in the Portugal, New Zealand, 
Russia, and Argentina have the lowest high asset liquidity. The mean (median) WAL1, WAL2, 
                                                                                                                                                             
to cash held in the domestic bank account. Nevertheless, the overall asset liquidity for cash is higher than the overall 
asset liquidity for current assets and fixed assets. 
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and WAL3 across all countries are 0.176 (0.110), 0.366 (0.331), and 0.640 (0.614), respectively. 
All three asset liquidity measures have slightly positively skewed distribution. The three asset 
liquidity measures are also highly correlated, according to the correlation matrix in Table 3. 
 
3.4  Firm-Level Independent Variables 
Following Stoll (2000), we control for some firm-level variables in our study. We use the 
log of total market capitalization in U.S. dollars (MV) to control for the size effect, the log of 
stock price in U.S. dollars (PRICE) to control for the discrete tick size effect, book-to-market 
equity ratio (BM) and capital expenditure deflated by lagged total assets (CAPEX) to control for 
growth firms effect, and debt to total assets ratio (LEVERAGE) to control for the firm’s financial 
leverage. LEVERAGE also acts as a proxy for the additional information generated by 
debtholders’ monitoring activities and disclosure requirement (Leftwich, 1981). The Sloan’s 
(1996) normalized accrual measure (ACCRUAL), a proxy for information asymmetry associated 
with a firm’s earnings, is added to control for differences in the quality of a firm’s earnings. We 
employ return on assets (ROA) and annual buy and hold abnormal return during the previous 
year (BHAR) to control for the firm’s operating performance and stock return performance, 
respectively. Finally, we include return volatility (RETVOL), which is the standard deviation of 
the monthly stock return over the preceding twelve months, to control for the risk of adverse 
price changes on the specialist’s stock inventory. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for 
the firm-level independent variables. Data for the variables are drawn from Datastream and 
Worldscope.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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3.5  Country-Level Institutional Factors 
Table 2 presents the country institutional factors that are used in the sub-sample analysis. 
First, to capture the cross-country variation in accounting information environment, we employ 
the accounting standards variable (ACCSTD), which is compiled by La Porta et al. (1998). The 
accounting standards variable is an index that rates the companies’ annual reports based on the 
inclusion or omission of 90 accounting items under the categories of general information, income 
statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special 
items. La Porta et al.’s (1998) accounting standards variable is designed as a measure of the level 
of accounting disclosure, not as a direct measure of reliability in accounting figures. The 
accounting standards variable acts as a proxy for cross-country variation in information 
asymmetry between the firms and their investors. 
Second, to capture the cross-country variation in legal regimes, we classify a country’s 
legal regime based its legal origin (LAW). La Porta et al. (1998) show that common-law 
countries (English legal origin) are associated with stronger investor protection and legal 
enforcement; while civil-law countries (French, German and Scandinavian legal origin) have 
weaker investor protection and legal enforcement. For robustness check, we also employ 
Djankov et al.’s (2008) anti-self-dealing index (ANTI) as an alternate measure of a country’s 
legal regime. The anti-self-dealing index (ANTI) is a measure of shareholder protection that 
focuses on private enforcement mechanisms. ANTI is calculated from prevailing legal rules in 
2003. 
 
3.6 Pair-Wise Correlation Analysis 
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Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between all the variables. Consistent with the 
valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that the stock liquidity (LIQ) measure is positively 
correlated with all three asset liquidity measures, but the correlation coefficients are significant 
only for WAL1 and WAL2. All three asset liquidity measures are highly correlated with each 
other. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 also indicates that the stock liquidity (LIQ) measure is positively correlated with 
MV, PRICE, LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, ROA, and BHAR. but negatively correlated with 
BM and CAPEX. Although not reported in Table 3, we find that the common-law variable and 
the anti-self-dealing index (ANTI) are highly correlated, with a coefficient of correlation of 0.735. 
In contrast, the accounting standards (ACCSTD) variable is only moderately correlated with legal 
origin and the anti-self-dealing index. The correlation coefficient for ACCSTD and common-law 
variable is 0.475 while the correlation coefficient for ACCSTD and anti-self-dealing index is 
0.460. 
 
4.  International Evidence on Asset-Stock Liquidity Relation 
The valuation uncertainty hypothesis predicts a positive relation between asset liquidity 
and stock liquidity, while the utilization uncertainty hypothesis predicts a negative relation. We 
employ the weighted asset liquidity (WAL) to study the asset-stock liquidity relationship and 
estimate the following equation: 
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(5) 
 
The dependent variable is the stock liquidity measure (LIQ). The variable of interest is 
WAL, which consists of three alternate definitions of the weighted asset liquidity measure 
specified in Section 3. The valuation uncertainty hypothesis predicts a positive β1, while the 
utilization uncertainty hypothesis predicts a negative β1. The firm-level independent variables, 
which are lagged by one year, are previously discussed in Section 3. In our multivariate 
regression analysis, we pool all the firm-year observations and estimate the above equation with 
two different sets of fixed effects. The first set of fixed effects consists of dummy variables that 
control for country, industry, and year effects. The second set of fixed effect consists of dummy 
variables for firm effect. The firm fixed effect controls for firm-level invariant factors such as 
corporate governance and disclosure policy.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results of the multivariate regressions are presented in Table 4. Model 1, Model 3, 
and Model 5 of the regressions are estimated with firm fixed-effects while Model 2, Model 4, 
and Model 6 are estimated with country, industry, and year fixed-effects. In support of the 
valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find strong international evidence of a positive relation 
between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Table 4 shows that the coefficient estimates for all the 
WAL measures are positive and statistically significant. Economically, the coefficient estimate of 
2.017 for WAL1 under Model 1 indicates that for one standard deviation increase in WAL1, stock 
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liquidity or the proportion of non-zero return trading days increases by 0.42%.
12
  The 0.42% 
improvement in stock liquidity is equivalent to about two-tenths of its standard deviation. The 
improvement in stock liquidity may appear low, but this result is not surprising because asset 
liquidity affects mostly the adverse selection component of stock liquidity, which only accounts 
for about 10% of the bid-ask spread of U.S. stocks (Huang and Stoll, 1997). The order 
processing cost and inventory cost components of stock liquidity are generally fixed costs in 
nature. Therefore, the 0.42% improvement in stock liquidity is actually considerable, given that 
this improvement stems predominantly from the reduction of the adverse selection component. 
The coefficient estimates for WAL2 and WAL3 also yield similar interpretation and conclusion. 
Overall, our results do not support the utilization uncertainty hypothesis, which predicts a 
negative asset-stock liquidity relation.  
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are mostly within expectations. We 
find that larger firms are associated with better stock liquidity. This result is attributable to larger 
firms having lower information asymmetry, a bigger investor base, and larger outstanding shares. 
Stock liquidity is higher for value firms (high BM), which have less information asymmetry than 
growth firms (low BM). More profitable firms (high ROA) are associated with higher stock 
liquidity. Stock liquidity is positively related to accruals (ACCRUAL) and return volatility 
(RETVOL), but negatively related to the level of stock price (PRICE). The estimated coefficients 
for LEVERAGE, CAPEX, and BHAR are generally unstable; i.e. the sign of the estimated 
coefficients depends on the type of fixed effects included. 
 
                                                 
12
 One standard deviation increase in WAL1 is equal to 0.207. Hence, the change in stock liquidity (LIQ) is equal to 
2.017 0.207 = 0.42%.  
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5. Asset-Stock Liquidity Relation under Different Accounting Information 
Environments 
 In this section, we study the asset-stock liquidity relation under different accounting 
information environments. First, we examine the cross-sectional variation in the asset-stock 
liquidity relation across countries with different accounting standards. Second, we investigate the 
structural changes in the asset-stock liquidity relation around the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
across the 47 countries. 
 
5.1 Sub-sample by Country’s Accounting Standards 
As a further test of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we now examine the asset-stock 
liquidity relation under different accounting standards. Under the valuation uncertainty 
hypothesis, the asset-stock liquidity relation is expected to be weaker in countries with good 
accounting standards, but stronger in countries with poor accounting standards. Also, as 
previously discussed in the hypothesis development section, different accounting standards do 
not have any predictable effects on the asset-stock liquidity relation under the utilization 
uncertainty hypothesis. 
 To examine the asset-stock liquidity relation under different accounting standards, we 
first partition our sample into two sub-samples according to the quality of the country’s 
accounting standards. The High ACCSTD sub-sample consists of firms from countries with 
accounting standards index that is above the median while the Low ACCSTD sub-sample 
includes firms from countries with accounting standards index that is below the median. Second, 
we separately estimate the asset-stock liquidity relation for each of the above sub-samples. 
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Finally, we examine the differential asset-stock liquidity relation for the two sub-samples by 
comparing the estimated WAL coefficients for the two sub-samples. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 reports the results pertaining to the above sub-sample analysis. Again, in support 
of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that asset-stock liquidity relation is weaker in 
countries with higher accounting standards. The coefficient estimates for all three asset liquidity 
measures (WAL1-WAL3) are significantly lower in the High ACCSTD sub-sample than in the 
Low ACCSTD sub-sample. For example, the WAL1 coefficient estimates for the High ACCSTD 
and Low ACCSTD sub-samples are equal to 0.935 and 6.031, respectively.  A statistical test 
based on the ΔWAL Coefficient for WAL1 further indicates that the WAL1 coefficient estimates 
are significantly different between the two sub-samples. Intuitively, the WAL1 finding indicates 
that the asset-stock liquidity relation is weaker in countries with higher accounting standards 
(High ACCSTD sub-sample) than in countries with lower accounting standards (Low ACCSTD 
sub-sample). The comparison of the WAL2 and WAL3 coefficient estimates across the two sub-
samples also yields similar result and conclusion. Overall, the results tabulated in Table 5 do not 
support the utilization uncertainty hypothesis. 
 
5.2 Impact of IFRS Adoption 
 In this section, we examine the structural changes in the asset-stock liquidity relation 
around the mandatory adoption of IFRS across 47 countries. As discussed previously in the 
hypothesis development section, the valuation uncertainty hypothesis posits a weaker asset-stock 
liquidity relation following the adoption of IFRS, but only in countries with strong legal regime. 
As a further test of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we first compare the asset-stock 
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liquidity relation before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS across the entire sample. We 
then partition our sample according to the legal regimes and examine the structural change in the 
asset-stock liquidity relation for each sub-sample.  
We first identify the IFRS adoption countries, which consist of all the countries having 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. The non-IFRS adoption countries are those that retain 
their domestic accounting standards during the sample period of 1996-2007. Our identification of 
the IFRS adoption countries is primarily based on the country list and adoption dates compiled 
by Daske et al. (2008). Second, in accordance with Daske et al. (2013), we exclude firms that are 
coded as voluntary adopters of IFRS to avoid any confounding effects due to the incentives for 
such firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to the mandated date. Also, to avoid a potential 
misclassification of the IFRS adoption by Worldscope (Daske et al., 2013), we remove firms that 
are located in an IFRS adoption country, but are coded as non-IFRS adopters. The firm-level 
reporting standards are obtained from Worldscope’s Field item 07536. Finally, we pool all the 
firm-year observations associated with the IFRS adoption countries and estimate the following 
multivariate regression equation. 
 
                                                                     
                                                          
                                                           
      
(6) 
In Equation (6), we add POSTIFRS, an indicator variable, which is set to 1 for firm-year 
observations after the IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. We also include POSTIFRS*WAL, an 
interaction term, to capture the effect of the IFRS adoption on the asset-stock liquidity relation. 
The 2 coefficient is thus a measure of the structural change in the asset-stock liquidity relation 
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post-IFRS. Under the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, the 2 coefficient is expected to be 
negative. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 We estimate Equation (6) for the sample of firms in the IFRS adoption countries and 
report the multivariate regression results in Panel A of Table 6. The tabulated results for the 
interaction variables are generally insignificant. We find that the estimated 2 coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero for all the three measures of WAL. One reason for the 
insignificant finding may be attributed to the heterogeneous implementation of IFRS across 
different countries. Countries with a strong legal regime are likely to be “serious” adopters of 
IFRS while countries with a weak legal regime are likely to adopt IFRS in label only (Daske et 
al., 2008). To investigate the effects associated with the heterogeneous implementation of IFRS, 
we split our sample based on the country’s legal origin. Alternatively, we also partition our 
sample based on Djankov et al.’s (2008) anti-self-dealing index (ANTI). We then estimate 
Equation (6) for each of the above sub-samples.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 reports the results of our sub-sample analysis by legal regimes. In Panel A, the 
sample is split based on legal origins. Common-law countries provide stronger investor 
protection and better legal enforcement than civil-law countries (La Porta et al., 1998). In Panel 
B, the sample is split based on Djankov et al.’s (2008) anti-self-dealing index (ANTI). The High 
and Low ANTI sub-samples consist of firms from countries with anti-self-dealing index that are 
above and below the median of ANTI, respectively.  
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 Consistent with Daske et al.’s (2008) hypothesis on the heterogeneous implementation of 
IFRS, we find some evidence of a weaker asset-stock liquidity relation following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, but only in countries with a strong legal regime (Common Law and High 
ANTI sub-samples). In countries with a strong legal regime, the 2 coefficient estimate for the 
POSTIFRS*WAL interaction term is significantly negative when WAL1 is used as the measure of 
asset liquidity. The negative 2 coefficient estimate, which indicates a structural decline in the 
asset-stock liquidity relation after the IFRS adoption, is consistent with the prediction of the 
valuation uncertainty hypothesis. The 2 coefficient estimates for the POSTIFRS*WAL 
interaction term are negative, but not significantly different from zero when WAL2 and WAL3 are 
used as the measures of asset liquidity.  
In countries with a weak legal regime (Civil Law and Low ANTI sub-samples), we do not 
observe any significant decline in the asset-stock liquidity relation. The 2 coefficient estimates 
for the POSTIFRS*WAL interaction term are not significantly different from zero for all the three 
measures of asset liquidity (WAL1-WAL3). In summary, as predicted by the valuation 
uncertainty hypothesis, we find some evidence indicating that the improved accounting 
information environment in the post-IFRS period results in a weaker asset-stock liquidity relation, 
but the decline in the sensitivity of asset-stock liquidity relation is applicable to countries with a 
strong legal regime only.  
For robustness, we also pool the observations from the IFRS adoption and non-adoption 
countries together and run a three-way interaction regression model for the combined sample to 
examine the interactive effects associated with WAL, post-IFRS, and IFRS adopting countries. 
Overall, we find the same interactive effect for the combined sample, i.e., the WAL coefficient 
estimate for the IFRS adoption countries declined significantly in the post-IFRS period, but only 
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in countries with a strong legal regime. The only difference between the combined sample and 
the IFRS adoption countries sub-sample regression results is the estimated post-IFRS WAL 
coefficient. The estimated post-IFRS WAL coefficient is significantly positive for the IFRS 
adoption countries sub-sample regression, but is negative for the combined sample regression. 
Using the domestic GAAP-IFRS difference measure from Bae et al. (2008), we compare 
the effect of IFRS on the asset-stock liquidity relation conditional on the domestic GAAP-IFRS 
difference. We do not find the distance to IFRS standards is able to explain the cross-country 
changes in asset-stock liquidity relation after the IFRS adoption. It is likely that the IFRS 
adoption improves the accounting information environment, and the improvement is conditional 
on the country’s legal regime rather than the distance to IFRS standards. 
 
6.  Robustness 
 First, as a further test of the utilization uncertainty hypothesis, we examine the asset-
stock liquidity relation under different legal regimes. In countries where legal protection for 
investors is weak, the expropriation risk associated with cash and other liquid assets is likely to 
be much higher. Under this condition, the utilization uncertainty hypothesis suggests that the 
asset-stock liquidity relation be more negative in countries with a weak legal regime. To 
investigate the effects of different legal regimes on the asset-stock liquidity relation, we split our 
sample based on either the country’s legal origin or anti-self-dealing index (ANTI).  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 Panel A and Panel B of Table 8 report the results from the re-estimation of the asset-stock 
liquidity relation for the legal origin sub-samples and the ANTI sub-samples, respectively. 
Contrary to the utilization uncertainty hypothesis, we find that the asset-stock liquidity relation is 
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not only positive, but significantly stronger in countries with a weak legal regime. The results 
presented in Table 8 may be attributed to the positive correlation between the weak legal regime 
and the poor accounting information environment among the 47 countries. Empirically, the asset-
stock liquidity relation depends on whether the valuation uncertainty effect or the utilization 
uncertainty effect is stronger. Our results indicate that the valuation uncertainty effect strongly 
dominates the utilization uncertainty effect in countries with a weak legal protection. Contrary to 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007)
13
, we find that higher cash and other liquid assets holdings contribute 
positively to the improvement in stock liquidity in countries with a weak legal regime. 
 Second, we examine the validity of our results using the bid-ask spread as an alternate 
measure of stock liquidity and report the results of hypotheses H2 and H3 in Table 9. Overall, we 
do not find any meaningful results using the bid-ask spread. Thus, our findings are applicable to 
the measure of stock liquidity based on the Zero Proportion only. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
7.  Transparency and Liquidity Effects associated with Asset-Stock Liquidity Relation 
 We now examine the individual balance sheet (Cash, Current Assets, Fixed Asset, and 
Intangible Assets) item’s relation with stock liquidity. As shown in Panel A of Table 10, we find 
that stock liquidity is positively related to both the firm’s cash holdings (WAL1) and intangible 
assets (INTANGIBLE). We also find a significant positive relation between non-cash current 
assets and stock liquidity. There is no statistically significant relation between fixed assets and 
stock liquidity. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
                                                 
13
 They find no evidence of a relative benefit of holding cash when country-level legal regime is poor. 
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 As discussed previously in Section 2, cash and its equivalents are both significantly less 
opaque and more liquid than other assets. The positive relation between cash holdings and stock 
liquidity may be due to transparency and/or liquidity reasons. In contrast, intangible assets are 
relatively illiquid. Thus, any significant relation that intangible assets have with stock liquidity is 
largely attributed to transparency reason, rather than liquidity reason. Although intangible assets 
are relatively more opaque than other assets, the accounting process of capitalizing and recording 
such assets on the balance sheet may actually increase the transparency of firms that do so, 
compared to firms that do not capitalize their intangible assets.  In basic accounting, intangible 
assets acquired in an arm’s length transaction are recognized based on their acquisition cost; 
while intangible assets received gratis are recorded at their fair value if there is an active market 
for such assets. For internally generated intangible assets, accounting standard allows the 
capitalization of development costs, but requires the expensing of research costs. Intangible 
assets are important on- and off-balance sheet revenue producing assets that account for a 
significant portion of a firm’s value. The financial statement recognition of such assets is 
therefore informative. Although many scholars argue that accountants do not do a good job in 
assessing the value of intangible assets, the accounting recognition and disclosure of such assets 
actually enhance the transparency of firms that account for such assets.  
 As a further test of the transparency effect associated with a firm’s cash holdings and 
intangible assets, we examine both the cash-stock liquidity and intangible assets-stock liquidity 
relations under different accounting information environments. If the above asset-stock liquidity 
relations are driven by transparency effect, then we would expect both asset-stock liquidity 
relations to be stronger in countries with poor accounting standards, i.e., investors rely more on 
firm-level asset transparency to resolving valuation uncertainty when external accounting 
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information environment is poor. Our empirical finding is consistent with the above expectation. 
As reported in Panel B of Table 10, we find that the coefficient estimates for both WAL1 and 
INTANGIBLE variables are significantly higher in countries with poor accounting standards.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 To study the liquidity effect, we then examine the asset-stock liquidity relations for firms 
that are financially constrained versus those that are not. We do so by interacting the individual 
balance sheet (Cash, Current Assets, Fixed Asset, and Intangible Assets) item with the financial 
constraint measure (FINCON). For robustness, we use two widely used measures of a firm’s 
financial constraints in the literature, namely the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) KZ index and the 
Whited and Wu (2006) WW index. Empirically, as reported in Table 11, we find that financially 
constrained firms (as measured by FINCON) have significantly lower stock liquidity. More 
importantly, the coefficient estimate for the WAL1*FINCON interaction term is consistently 
significant under both the LIQ measure of liquidity and the bid-ask spread measure of liquidity. 
In the other words, cash-stock liquidity relation is significantly stronger under financially-
constraint firms. The INTANGIBLE*FINCON interaction term is not significant under the LIQ 
measure of liquidity. The bid-ask spread measure of liquidity, in contrast, yields inconclusive 
and contradictory INTANGIBLE*FINCON interaction results.   
 Thus, our results indicate that from a liquidity perspective, cash and its equivalents play a 
significant role in resolving valuation uncertainty associated with financially constrained firms
14
. 
In contrast, intangible assets are relatively illiquid and, hence, do not play any significant role in 
resolving the problems faced by financially constrained firms. Overall, the above findings 
indicate that the cash-stock liquidity relation is driven by both transparency and liquidity effects 
                                                 
14
 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) point out that distress firms suffer from the low value for fire assets sales especially 
for the illiquid assets. 
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while the intangible assets-stock liquidity relation is attributed largely to a transparency effect 
only. The findings for the non-cash current assets and stock liquidity relation and the fixed assets 
and stock liquidity relation are generally mixed and inconclusive. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 In this study, we examine the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 
47 countries. Consistent with the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find strong evidence of a 
positive relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity in international capital markets. We 
also find that the accounting information environment is an important determinant of the asset-
stock liquidity relation. The asset-stock liquidity relation is stronger in countries with poor 
accounting standards. We report some evidence that the improved accounting information 
environment in the post-IFRS period results in a structural decline in the asset-stock liquidity 
relation in countries with a strong legal regime. Our findings are consistent with the valuation 
uncertainty hypothesis, which posits that in countries where accounting standards and 
information disclosure quality are poor, investors are more reliant on the firm’s asset liquidity 
structure to value the firm.  
 Overall, our findings also add to the literature on the value of cash holdings in 
international capital markets (Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 
2006). The finding on the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity in international 
capital markets indicates that liquid assets holdings in a firm can contribute positively to the 
firm’s stock liquidity, especially in countries with poor accounting standards. Our findings also 
open up the possibility that managers can actively manage asset structure to influence stock 
liquidity. To do so, managers may need to include current assets in addition to cash in treasury 
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and management. Finally, although our paper primarily addresses the asset-stock liquidity 
relation, it is also theoretically possible to develop such a relation for asset liquidity and debt 
securities liquidity. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 Despite these findings, we do not attempt to determine whether our IFRS-based results 
are due to the adoption of IFRS per se  (Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; 
Tan et al. 2011) or due to changes in reporting enforcement (Christensen et al., 2013a). To do so, 
one needs to develop a research design that convincingly separates the effects associated with the 
change in accounting standards from the effects associated with changes in reporting 
enforcement. However, the debate between Barth and Israeli (2013) and Christensen et al. 
(2013b) suggests that coming up with a convincing research design to tackle this problem is not 
easy. This issue is a promising area for further research. 
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Appendix 1 
Description of Variables 
   Variable Description Source 
LIQ Proportion of trading days with non-zero return in a given year Datastream/Worldscope 
lnBAS Log of average closing bid-ask spread in a given year. The daily 
closing bid-ask spread is measured by the absolute difference of 
closing ask and bid prices deflated by the average of bid and ask 
prices. 
Datastream/Worldscope 
   WAL1 WAL1 is equal to cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged value 
of Total Assets.  
Datastream/Worldscope 
WAL2 WAL2 is equal to (Cash + 0.5*Non-cash Current Assets) divided by 
lagged value of Total Assets.  
Datastream/Worldscope 
WAL3 WAL3 is equal to (Cash + 0.75*Non-cash Current Assets + 
0.5*Tangible Fixed Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. 
Datastream/Worldscope 
   
POSTIFRS An indicator variable that is equal to 1 for post-IFRS adoption firm-
year observations and 0 otherwise. 
Datastream/Worldscope 
and Daske et al. (2008) 
MV Log of the firm’s market capitalization in million US dollars. Datastream/Worldscope 
BM Book-to-market equity ratio. Datastream/Worldscope 
PRICE Log of stock price in US dollars. Datastream/Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets. Datastream/Worldscope 
ACCRUAL Sloan’s (1996) measure of a firm's accruals.  Datastream/Worldscope 
RETVOL Log of standard deviation of monthly stock returns over preceding 
twelve months. 
Datastream/Worldscope 
CAPEX Ratio of firm's Capital Expenditures to lagged Total Assets. Datastream/Worldscope 
ROA Ratio of EBITDA to lagged value of Total Assets. Datastream/Worldscope 
BHAR Buy-and-hold annual abnormal stock returns, which is equal to 
firm's annual stock return minus the return on the country's stock 
market. 
Datastream/Worldscope 
   ACCSTD La Porta et al.’s (1998) index that measures a nation’s quality of 
accounting standards. 
LLSV (1998) 
LAW Legal origin of a country. Djankov et al. (2008) 
ANTI Anti-self-dealing index compiled by Djankov et al. (2008) Djankov et al. (2008) 
      
This appendix describes all variables used in the analysis and their data sources. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Asset and Stock Liquidity Measures 
                       
      WAL1   WAL2   WAL3   LIQ   lnBAS 
Country NObs   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std 
 
NObs Mean Median Std 
Argentina 390 
 
0.082 0.060 0.083 
 
0.253 0.206 0.171 
 
0.629 0.585 0.200 
 
65.728 72.801 24.058 
 
166 -3.733 -3.747 0.786 
Australia 2,632 
 
0.182 0.077 0.264 
 
0.335 0.270 0.277 
 
0.620 0.569 0.336 
 
85.470 92.308 19.713 
 
2,193 -3.952 -3.994 0.924 
Austria 459 
 
0.107 0.071 0.142 
 
0.304 0.281 0.175 
 
0.604 0.596 0.200 
 
73.482 87.500 28.689 
 
345 -3.950 -3.870 1.036 
Belgium 757 
 
0.125 0.079 0.138 
 
0.340 0.313 0.188 
 
0.608 0.593 0.213 
 
78.507 87.160 22.753 
 
741 -4.390 -4.288 1.061 
Brazil 407 
 
0.185 0.141 0.170 
 
0.358 0.318 0.220 
 
0.655 0.622 0.234 
 
78.012 93.227 29.146 
 
389 -3.768 -4.079 1.281 
Canada 4,345 
 
0.198 0.076 0.296 
 
0.335 0.253 0.312 
 
0.671 0.600 0.351 
 
84.673 89.641 15.914 
 
1,839 -4.194 -4.187 1.033 
Chile 631 
 
0.098 0.054 0.139 
 
0.233 0.199 0.162 
 
0.577 0.580 0.197 
 
55.861 58.333 31.222 
 
249 -3.556 -3.589 1.066 
China 9,456 
 
0.196 0.156 0.158 
 
0.375 0.348 0.202 
 
0.674 0.654 0.228 
 
94.283 96.203 6.973 
 
9,445 -6.222 -6.252 0.592 
Czech Republic 62 
 
0.093 0.038 0.162 
 
0.204 0.120 0.197 
 
0.563 0.553 0.144 
 
82.202 97.211 29.037 
 
0 
   Denmark 1,018 
 
0.149 0.076 0.213 
 
0.353 0.322 0.228 
 
0.650 0.631 0.247 
 
65.670 75.498 27.223 
 
928 -4.040 -4.061 1.061 
Finland 1,075 
 
0.139 0.084 0.164 
 
0.351 0.319 0.188 
 
0.613 0.598 0.202 
 
77.910 84.064 20.037 
 
1,043 -4.333 -4.282 1.056 
France 4,949 
 
0.162 0.113 0.167 
 
0.404 0.378 0.198 
 
0.627 0.614 0.225 
 
78.588 87.352 23.038 
 
4,899 -4.149 -4.086 1.335 
Germany 4,880 
 
0.169 0.098 0.199 
 
0.384 0.350 0.215 
 
0.618 0.601 0.235 
 
80.055 87.747 21.060 
 
4,590 -3.813 -3.714 0.885 
Greece 1,203 
 
0.086 0.044 0.131 
 
0.321 0.297 0.164 
 
0.636 0.617 0.181 
 
80.832 84.980 15.020 
 
533 -3.870 -3.925 0.740 
Hong Kong 975 
 
0.244 0.190 0.222 
 
0.376 0.341 0.271 
 
0.636 0.617 0.298 
 
86.570 91.093 13.070 
 
975 -4.880 -4.957 0.786 
Hungary 210 
 
0.098 0.062 0.101 
 
0.300 0.281 0.175 
 
0.640 0.623 0.180 
 
79.189 88.486 22.224 
 
149 -3.123 -3.273 0.858 
India 4,610 
 
0.104 0.045 0.153 
 
0.360 0.317 0.204 
 
0.715 0.680 0.232 
 
95.596 98.795 9.558 
 
367 -5.324 -5.335 0.731 
Indonesia 305 
 
0.201 0.149 0.176 
 
0.416 0.387 0.209 
 
0.788 0.735 0.244 
 
59.208 67.755 29.158 
 
249 -3.761 -4.002 1.267 
Ireland 266 
 
0.229 0.154 0.206 
 
0.401 0.390 0.203 
 
0.651 0.642 0.244 
 
90.632 100.000 20.152 
 
224 -4.194 -4.217 0.837 
Israel 1,213 
 
0.189 0.120 0.216 
 
0.391 0.364 0.226 
 
0.630 0.613 0.249 
 
77.980 91.429 24.824 
 
932 -3.567 -3.367 1.282 
Italy 1,631 
 
0.126 0.086 0.131 
 
0.339 0.318 0.174 
 
0.588 0.582 0.223 
 
91.659 95.238 11.477 
 
1,630 -4.495 -4.614 0.870 
Japan 23,727 
 
0.162 0.127 0.134 
 
0.354 0.344 0.149 
 
0.612 0.605 0.132 
 
84.734 91.020 16.946 
 
18,571 -4.704 -4.790 0.869 
Luxembourg 43 
 
0.125 0.059 0.142 
 
0.251 0.219 0.176 
 
0.471 0.427 0.186 
 
64.503 80.460 32.572 
 
21 -4.369 -4.523 0.880 
Malaysia 1,988 
 
0.174 0.126 0.160 
 
0.346 0.326 0.178 
 
0.659 0.650 0.213 
 
72.028 73.984 15.732 
 
1,864 -4.103 -4.252 0.720 
Mexico 669 
 
0.108 0.080 0.096 
 
0.270 0.234 0.153 
 
0.614 0.612 0.187 
 
87.220 100.000 25.046 
 
576 -3.950 -4.062 1.127 
Netherlands 1,086 
 
0.128 0.066 0.167 
 
0.371 0.324 0.220 
 
0.631 0.616 0.269 
 
83.867 91.700 19.696 
 
930 -4.762 -4.715 1.326 
New Zealand 494 
 
0.074 0.025 0.128 
 
0.240 0.220 0.194 
 
0.573 0.555 0.214 
 
66.012 72.619 21.524 
 
494 -4.137 -4.216 0.805 
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      WAL1   WAL2   WAL3   LIQ   lnBAS 
Country NObs   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   NObs Mean Median Std 
Norway 882 
 
0.205 0.121 0.245 
 
0.353 0.277 0.281 
 
0.641 0.588 0.310 
 
72.819 83.333 25.745 
 
882 -3.990 -4.030 1.219 
Pakistan 557 
 
0.162 0.090 0.191 
 
0.385 0.359 0.206 
 
0.737 0.711 0.205 
 
67.786 80.913 30.485 
 
185 -1.667 -1.293 1.291 
Peru 326 
 
0.150 0.081 0.204 
 
0.312 0.259 0.231 
 
0.644 0.596 0.235 
 
85.610 100.000 24.763 
 
73 -3.229 -3.190 0.871 
Philippines 131 
 
0.189 0.137 0.177 
 
0.312 0.282 0.196 
 
0.637 0.599 0.216 
 
63.971 71.311 23.769 
 
131 -4.103 -4.389 1.158 
Poland 935 
 
0.122 0.066 0.183 
 
0.360 0.310 0.242 
 
0.681 0.632 0.296 
 
86.926 89.286 10.561 
 
908 -4.283 -4.302 0.828 
Portugal 422 
 
0.070 0.040 0.099 
 
0.243 0.205 0.149 
 
0.529 0.510 0.193 
 
74.060 81.347 23.654 
 
422 -4.238 -4.419 1.306 
Russia 11 
 
0.076 0.061 0.082 
 
0.269 0.227 0.155 
 
0.644 0.620 0.222 
 
33.114 33.600 16.157 
 
11 -2.707 -2.794 0.633 
Singapore 873 
 
0.207 0.156 0.182 
 
0.364 0.329 0.224 
 
0.629 0.601 0.252 
 
79.382 81.992 17.558 
 
669 -4.451 -4.672 0.828 
South Africa 1,173 
 
0.163 0.122 0.151 
 
0.381 0.367 0.200 
 
0.690 0.674 0.235 
 
76.292 83.871 22.054 
 
1,172 -4.052 -4.163 0.913 
South Korea 5,825 
 
0.130 0.091 0.130 
 
0.325 0.302 0.164 
 
0.636 0.614 0.192 
 
91.545 92.771 5.303 
 
5,548 -4.998 -4.996 0.634 
Spain 931 
 
0.105 0.066 0.129 
 
0.316 0.289 0.184 
 
0.629 0.614 0.215 
 
87.179 92.800 16.149 
 
906 -5.128 -5.045 0.961 
Sri Lanka 247 
 
0.132 0.080 0.177 
 
0.310 0.281 0.224 
 
0.691 0.660 0.254 
 
50.062 51.667 26.256 
 
111 -2.593 -2.546 0.862 
Sweden 1,889 
 
0.176 0.098 0.215 
 
0.393 0.349 0.233 
 
0.616 0.596 0.262 
 
81.277 85.771 15.608 
 
1,546 -4.269 -4.278 1.014 
Switzerland 1,692 
 
0.174 0.130 0.171 
 
0.369 0.348 0.198 
 
0.629 0.616 0.211 
 
76.745 85.317 23.076 
 
1,691 -4.416 -4.305 1.135 
Taiwan 3,424 
 
0.226 0.183 0.176 
 
0.425 0.401 0.208 
 
0.703 0.683 0.213 
 
90.521 91.600 5.584 
 
1,821 -5.654 -5.725 0.484 
Thailand 1,298 
 
0.124 0.082 0.125 
 
0.291 0.277 0.153 
 
0.607 0.609 0.168 
 
65.375 70.498 28.502 
 
870 -3.752 -4.051 1.118 
Turkey 1,586 
 
0.154 0.081 0.209 
 
0.420 0.379 0.245 
 
0.777 0.723 0.297 
 
83.414 84.337 5.466 
 
1,347 -4.782 -4.855 0.313 
UK 6,539 
 
0.168 0.095 0.219 
 
0.364 0.321 0.250 
 
0.622 0.601 0.283 
 
65.521 68.651 28.744 
 
6,538 -3.917 -3.687 1.242 
US 29,731 
 
0.220 0.110 0.277 
 
0.393 0.334 0.289 
 
0.639 0.594 0.295 
 
92.995 97.222 10.226 
 
12,078 -5.641 -6.044 1.280 
Venezuela 29   0.119 0.088 0.087   0.261 0.215 0.165   0.676 0.634 0.251   65.296 79.675 30.974 
 
0 
   All Countries 127,982   0.176 0.110 0.207   0.366 0.331 0.228   0.640 0.614 0.245   85.259 92.713 18.864   91,251 -4.745 -4.761 1.260 
                       This table reports summary statistics of the asset liquidity and stock liquidity variables. WAL1, WAL2, and WAL3 are the three different measures of asset liquidity. WAL1 is equal to cash and cash 
equivalents divided by lagged value of Total Assets. WAL2 is equal to (Cash + 0.5*Non-cash Current Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. WAL3 is equal to (Cash + 0.75*Non-cash Current 
Assets + 0.5*Tangible Fixed Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. LIQ (stock liquidity), which is equal to the proportion of non-zero return trading days in a given year. lnBAS is log of 
average closing bid-ask spread in a given year. The daily closing bid-ask spread is measured by the absolute difference of closing ask and bid prices deflated by the average of bid and ask prices. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. There are 47 countries in the sample. NObs is the number of firm-year observations for each country. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Firm-level Characteristics and Country-level Institutional Factors 
              
                            
Country NObs ACCSTD LAW ANTI MV BM PRICE LEVERAGE ACCRUAL RETVOL CAPEX ROA BHAR 
Argentina 390 45 Civil 0.342 4.882 1.556 0.616 0.250 -0.034 -2.155 0.061 7.696 0.165 
Australia 2,632 75 Common 0.757 5.567 0.548 0.746 0.196 -0.035 -2.344 0.078 4.993 0.278 
Austria 459 54 Civil 0.213 5.361 1.266 3.727 0.257 -0.051 -2.556 0.070 4.724 0.038 
Belgium 757 61 Civil 0.544 5.468 0.777 3.701 0.251 -0.055 -2.512 0.071 4.661 0.024 
Brazil 407 54 Civil 0.274 6.462 1.223 2.182 0.295 -0.024 -2.028 0.068 9.806 0.234 
Canada 4,345 74 Common 0.642 5.375 0.775 1.699 0.188 -0.045 -2.167 0.089 0.064 0.222 
Chile 631 52 Civil 0.625 6.206 0.834 1.068 0.238 -0.036 -2.685 0.066 8.904 0.104 
China 9,456 
 
Civil 0.763 5.896 0.393 0.218 0.266 -0.019 -2.127 0.067 4.694 0.082 
Czech Republic 62 
 
Civil 0.333 6.757 1.297 3.172 0.153 -0.073 -2.397 0.074 7.562 -0.004 
Denmark 1,018 62 Civil 0.463 4.897 0.925 3.572 0.254 -0.039 -2.426 0.070 3.673 0.024 
Finland 1,075 77 Civil 0.457 5.360 0.837 2.235 0.234 -0.048 -2.404 0.064 6.283 0.019 
France 4,949 69 Civil 0.379 5.169 0.792 3.338 0.210 -0.044 -2.318 0.049 3.483 0.046 
Germany 4,880 62 Civil 0.282 4.828 0.959 2.734 0.201 -0.052 -2.243 0.054 1.663 0.035 
Greece 1,203 55 Civil 0.217 4.413 1.168 1.224 0.294 -0.024 -2.102 0.054 3.911 0.044 
Hong Kong 975 69 Common 0.963 7.275 0.662 0.360 0.172 -0.022 -2.265 0.059 10.798 0.420 
Hungary 210 
 
Civil 0.181 4.740 1.127 2.372 0.171 -0.055 -2.215 0.095 5.638 -0.012 
India 4,610 57 Common 0.579 5.101 0.843 1.394 0.278 -0.009 -1.951 0.089 10.282 0.191 
Indonesia 305 
 
Civil 0.653 5.802 0.779 0.217 0.235 -0.022 -2.145 0.085 13.954 0.327 
Ireland 266 
 
Common 0.789 6.554 0.544 1.712 0.250 -0.032 -2.417 0.057 7.550 0.152 
Israel 1,213 64 Common 0.725 4.360 0.954 1.456 0.297 -0.027 -2.203 0.041 4.843 0.124 
Italy 1,631 62 Civil 0.421 5.805 0.894 1.553 0.263 -0.043 -2.421 0.047 2.667 0.010 
Japan 23,727 65 Civil 0.499 5.529 1.191 1.905 0.232 -0.031 -2.391 0.039 2.148 0.063 
Luxembourg 43 
 
Civil 0.283 6.624 1.542 3.696 0.209 -0.065 -2.521 0.047 3.869 -0.012 
Malaysia 1,988 76 Common 0.950 5.178 0.745 0.149 0.187 -0.015 -2.386 0.059 8.381 0.162 
Mexico 669 60 Civil 0.172 6.737 1.092 0.756 0.223 -0.023 -2.354 0.058 8.588 0.093 
Netherlands 1,086 64 Civil 0.203 5.925 0.606 2.895 0.218 -0.048 -2.428 0.057 6.120 0.037 
New Zealand 494 70 Common 0.950 5.114 0.655 0.632 0.256 -0.033 -2.657 0.066 8.507 0.075 
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Country NObs ACCSTD LAW ANTI MV BM PRICE LEVERAGE ACCRUAL RETVOL CAPEX ROA BHAR 
Norway 882 74 Civil 0.421 5.537 0.790 1.900 0.312 -0.041 -2.193 0.089 3.819 0.133 
Pakistan 557 
 
Common 0.408 4.361 0.769 0.559 0.234 -0.015 -2.214 0.082 12.797 0.191 
Peru 326 38 Civil 0.450 4.649 2.036 0.746 0.176 -0.035 -2.329 0.066 13.410 0.294 
Philippines 131 65 Civil 0.215 6.636 0.698 1.009 0.272 -0.044 -2.339 0.088 10.347 0.232 
Poland 935 
 
Civil 0.288 4.348 0.899 1.717 0.178 -0.027 -2.033 0.073 5.779 0.227 
Portugal 422 36 Civil 0.444 5.286 1.014 1.605 0.364 -0.057 -2.522 0.054 3.198 -0.008 
Russia 11 
 
Civil 0.440 5.826 4.501 1.899 0.156 0.025 -1.720 0.071 13.722 1.246 
Singapore 873 78 Common 1.000 6.272 0.991 0.415 0.199 -0.021 -2.367 0.062 7.982 0.178 
South Africa 1,173 70 Common 0.813 6.067 0.674 1.185 0.154 -0.026 -2.350 0.074 11.603 0.114 
South Korea 5,825 62 Civil 0.469 4.463 1.988 2.196 0.282 -0.027 -1.982 0.053 4.703 0.061 
Spain 931 64 Civil 0.374 6.446 0.641 2.536 0.274 -0.037 -2.506 0.057 6.103 0.044 
Sri Lanka 247 
 
Common 0.392 3.027 1.059 0.264 0.187 -0.006 -2.115 0.056 9.396 0.242 
Sweden 1,889 83 Civil 0.333 4.984 0.701 1.843 0.191 -0.038 -2.248 0.045 2.648 0.095 
Switzerland 1,692 68 Civil 0.267 5.825 0.872 5.024 0.216 -0.046 -2.517 0.046 4.852 0.059 
Taiwan 3,424 65 Civil 0.565 5.754 0.571 0.109 0.187 -0.018 -2.163 0.061 9.004 0.236 
Thailand 1,298 64 Common 0.813 4.404 1.042 0.381 0.244 -0.040 -2.354 0.071 9.476 0.203 
Turkey 1,586 51 Civil 0.429 4.643 0.876 1.597 0.199 -0.013 -1.918 0.062 9.598 0.058 
UK 6,539 78 Common 0.950 5.548 0.673 1.210 0.165 -0.041 -2.329 0.057 4.482 0.132 
US 29,731 71 Common 0.654 6.062 0.675 2.641 0.199 -0.040 -2.110 0.058 1.750 0.139 
Venezuela 29 40 Civil 0.092 5.944 2.664 0.788 0.120 -0.069 -1.947 0.065 9.261 0.207 
All Countries 127,982 63.081 
 
0.499 5.545 0.874 1.879 0.221 -0.034 -2.230 0.058 3.980 0.114 
                            
              This table reports the average values of the variables for both institutional and firm-level by country. ACCSTD is the La Porta et al.’s (1998) index that measures a nation’s quality of accounting 
standards. LAW indicates the legal origin of a country. ANTI is the anti-self-dealing index compiled by Djankov et al. (2008). MV is equal to the log of the firm’s market capitalization in million 
US dollars. BM is the book-to-market equity ratio. PRICE is equal to the log of stock price in US dollars. LEVERAGE is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets. ACCRUAL is the Sloan’s (1996) 
measure of a firm's accruals. RETVOL is the log of standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the preceding twelve months. CAPEX is equal to the ratio of firm's Capital Expenditures to 
lagged Total Assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to lagged value of Total Assets. BHAR, which is a measure of the buy-and-hold annual abnormal stock returns, is equal to firm's annual stock 
return minus the return on the country's stock market. All firm-level continuous firm-level characteristics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NObs is number of firm-year observations. 
Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 3 
 Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable LIQ lnBAS WAL1 WAL2 WAL3 MV BM PRICE LEVERAGE ACCRUAL RETVOL CAPEX ROA BHAR 
LIQ 1 
             
               lnBAS -0.683 1 
            
 
(0.00) 
             WAL1 0.063 -0.042 1 
           
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
            WAL2 0.024 0.016 0.851 1 
          
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
           WAL3 0.002 0.001 0.652 0.844 1 
         
 
(0.48) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) 
          MV 0.478 -0.649 -0.028 -0.125 -0.114 1 
        
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         BM -0.176 0.246 -0.141 -0.134 -0.113 -0.381 1 
       
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        PRICE 0.171 -0.154 0.011 0.010 -0.014 0.421 -0.176 1 
      
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       LEVERAGE 0.033 -0.072 -0.365 -0.375 -0.226 0.037 0.049 -0.082 1 
     
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      ACCRUAL 0.020 -0.028 -0.006 0.119 0.106 -0.013 -0.015 -0.017 0.024 1 
    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     RETVOL 0.119 0.037 0.183 0.186 0.138 -0.213 0.019 -0.192 -0.006 -0.010 1 
   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
    CAPEX 0.031 -0.038 -0.097 -0.176 0.089 0.082 -0.100 0.027 0.109 -0.112 0.022 1 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   ROA 0.036 -0.151 -0.159 -0.068 0.030 0.210 -0.069 0.167 -0.027 0.173 -0.210 0.093 1 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  BHAR 0.069 -0.064 0.126 0.142 0.162 0.090 -0.150 0.079 -0.062 0.036 0.270 0.013 0.106 1 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
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This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix for firm-level variables. LIQ (stock liquidity), which is equal to the proportion of non-zero return trading days in a given year. lnBAS is log of 
average closing bid-ask spread in a given year. The daily closing bid-ask spread is measured by the absolute difference of closing ask and bid prices deflated by the average of bid and ask prices. 
WAL1, WAL2, and WAL3 are the three different measures of asset liquidity. WAL1 is equal to cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged value of Total Assets. WAL2 is equal to (Cash + 0.5*Non-
cash Current Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. WAL3 is equal to (Cash + 0.75*Non-cash Current Assets + 0.5*Tangible Fixed Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. MV is 
equal to the log of the firm’s market capitalization in million US dollars. BM is the book-to-market equity ratio. PRICE is equal to the log of stock price in US dollars. LEVERAGE is the ratio of 
Total Debt to Total Assets. ACCRUAL is the Sloan’s (1996) measure of a firm's accruals. RETVOL is the log of standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the preceding twelve months. 
CAPEX is equal to the ratio of firm's Capital Expenditures to lagged Total Assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to lagged value of Total Assets. BHAR, which is a measure of the buy-and-hold annual 
abnormal stock returns, is equal to firm's annual stock return minus the return on the country's stock market. All continuous firm-level characteristics in are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The p-values are reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 4 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis of Asset Liquidity on Stock Liquidity 
 
 
LIQi or lnBASi= α0 + β1WALi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
 
Variables LIQ LIQ LIQ 
 
      
 
WAL1 2.203 
   
  
(5.23) 
   
 
WAL2 
 
3.155 
  
   
(8.65) 
  
 
WAL3 
  
2.290 
 
    
(8.80) 
 
 
MV 5.437 5.483 5.481 
 
  
(22.11) (22.18) (22.12) 
 
 
BM 0.125 0.186 0.153 
 
  
(0.58) (0.87) (0.72) 
 
 
PRICE -0.711 -0.722 -0.718 
 
  
(-3.88) (-3.95) (-3.90) 
 
 
LEVERAGE 1.974 2.373 1.850 
 
  
(3.05) (3.62) (2.85) 
 
 
ACCRUAL 3.412 2.698 2.911 
 
  
(4.30) (3.52) (3.88) 
 
 
RETVOL 4.953 4.919 4.982 
 
  
(10.24) (10.26) (10.27) 
 
 
CAPEX 0.588 1.246 -0.837 
 
  
(0.48) (1.02) (-0.68) 
 
 
ROA 0.006 0.004 0.001 
 
  
(0.72) (0.48) (0.16) 
 
 
BHAR -0.621 -0.667 -0.674 
 
 
  (-1.42) (-1.53) (-1.54) 
 
 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
 
NObs 127,982 127,982 127,982 
 
 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 
 
      
      This table reports the results of our multivariate regressions. The dependent variable is LIQ (non-zero 
return proportion), which is equal to the proportion of non-zero return trading days in a given year. WAL1, 
WAL2, and WAL3 are the three different measures of asset liquidity. WAL1 is equal to cash and cash 
equivalents divided by lagged value of Total Assets. WAL2 is equal to (Cash + 0.5*Non-cash Current 
Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. WAL3 is equal to (Cash + 0.75*Non-cash Current Assets 
+ 0.5*Tangible Fixed Assets) divided by lagged value of Total Assets. MV is equal to the log of the firm’s 
market capitalization in million US dollars. BM is the book-to-market equity ratio. PRICE is equal to the 
log of stock price in US dollars. LEVERAGE is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets. ACCRUAL is the 
Sloan’s (1996) measure of a firm's accruals. RETVOL is the log of standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the preceding twelve months. CAPEX is equal to the ratio of firm's Capital Expenditures to 
lagged Total Assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to lagged value of Total Assets. BHAR, which is a 
measure of the buy-and-hold annual abnormal stock returns, is equal to firm's annual stock return minus 
the return on the country's stock market. NObs is the number of observations. To conserve space, the 
coefficient estimates for the Intercept term and the Firm, Country (C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) fixed-
effects are not tabulated. Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the firm and year level are 
reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 5 
Asset Liquidity on Stock Liquidity -- ACCSTD Subsample Analysis 
LIQi = α0 + β1WALi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
Variables 
Low ACCSTD High ACCSTD 
 
Low ACCSTD High ACCSTD 
 
Low ACCSTD High ACCSTD 
LIQ LIQ 
 
LIQ LIQ 
 
LIQ LIQ 
WAL1 6.031 0.935 
      
 
(5.40) (1.74) 
      WAL2 
   
6.281 2.376 
   
    
(5.79) (4.78) 
   WAL3 
      
3.897 2.050 
       
(4.61) (5.44) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 29,371 86,519 
 
29,371 86,519 
 
29,371 86,519 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.50   0.43 0.50   0.43 0.50 
Δ WAL 
Coefficient -5.097 
 
-3.905 
 
-1.847 
(t-statistics) (-3.92)   (-3.08)   (-1.77) 
         This table reports the ACCSTD sub-sample multivariate regression results. The sample is split into Low ACCSTD and High ACCSTD sub-
samples. The High ACCSTD sub-sample consists of firms from countries with accounting standards index that is above the median; while 
the Low ACCSTD sub-sample consists of firms from countries with accounting standards index that is below the median. The dependent 
variable is LIQ (non-zero return proportion). WAL1, WAL2, and WAL3 are the three different measures of asset liquidity. The firm-specific 
control variables included in the regression are MV, BM, PRICE, LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, ROA, and BHAR. The 
definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ΔWAL 
Coefficient is equal to the difference in WAL coefficient estimates for the High ACCSTD and Low ACCSTD sub-samples. NObs is the 
number of observations.  To conserve space, the coefficient estimates for the Intercept term, firm-specific control variables, and Country 
(C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) fixed-effects are not tabulated. Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the firm and year level are 
reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 6 
Impact of IFRS Adoption on Asset-Stock Liquidity Relationship 
LIQi = α0 + β1WALi + β2POSTIFRSi*WALi + β3POSTIFRSi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Variables LIQ   LIQ   LIQ 
WAL1 3.498 
    
 
(2.45) 
    WAL2 
  
5.076 
  
   
(3.91) 
  WAL3 
    
3.200 
     
(3.20) 
POSTIFRS*WAL -0.957 
 
0.949 
 
1.253 
 
(-0.63) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(1.27) 
POSTIFRS 1.725 
 
1.171 
 
0.679 
 
(7.02) 
 
(2.65) 
 
(1.12) 
      Firm Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y 
NObs 33,729 
 
33,729 
 
33,729 
Adjusted R2 0.52   0.53   0.52 
      This table reports the multivariate regression results for the IFRS adoption. All samples from IFRS adopting countries 
are included. The dependent variable is LIQ (non-zero return proportion). WAL1, WAL2, and WAL3 are the three 
different measures of asset liquidity. The firm-specific control variables included in the regression are MV, BM, PRICE, 
LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, ROA, and BHAR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. POSTIFRS is 
an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for post-IFRS adoption firm-year observations and 0 otherwise. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NObs is the number of observations. To conserve space, the 
coefficient estimates for the Intercept term, firm-specific control variables, and Country (C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) 
fixed-effects are not reported. Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the firm and year level are reported in 
parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 7 
Impact of IFRS Adoption on Asset-Stock Liquidity Relationship:  Sub-sample Analysis 
LIQi = α0 + β1WALi + β2POSTIFRSi*WALi + β3POSTIFRSi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
Panel A: Sub-sample Analysis by Leagl Origin 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
Variables LIQ LIQ   LIQ LIQ   LIQ LIQ 
WAL1 4.454 5.477 
      
 
(2.28) (3.18) 
      WAL2 
   
7.129 5.558 
   
    
(4.16) (3.10) 
   WAL3 
      
4.400 3.656 
       
(3.72) (2.32) 
POSTIFRS*WAL -2.066 -3.078 
 
-1.290 -0.537 
 
-0.063 -0.510 
 
(-1.12) (-1.82) 
 
(-0.85) (-0.32) 
 
(-0.05) (-0.29) 
POSTIFRS 1.065 0.777 
 
1.222 0.383 
 
0.711 0.506 
 
(2.52) (1.11) 
 
(1.85) (0.40) 
 
(0.96) (0.35) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 23,084 10,645 
 
23,084 10,645 
 
23,084 10,645 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.63   0.49 0.64   0.49 0.63 
         Panel B: Sub-sample Analysis by Anti-self-dealing Index 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
Variables LIQ LIQ   LIQ LIQ   LIQ LIQ 
WAL1 4.332 5.790 
      
 
(1.97) (3.64) 
      WAL2 
   
7.426 5.469 
   
    
(4.08) (3.40) 
   WAL3 
      
4.450 3.646 
       
(3.73) (2.66) 
POSTIFRS*WAL -0.832 -3.916 
 
-0.937 -0.526 
 
-0.233 -0.202 
 
(-0.41) (-2.72) 
 
(-0.58) (-0.36) 
 
(-0.19) (-0.14) 
POSTIFRS 0.635 2.507 
 
0.873 1.979 
 
0.597 1.903 
 
(1.36) (5.84) 
 
(1.23) (2.81) 
 
(0.77) (1.66) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 20,287 13,442 
 
20,287 13,442 
 
20,287 13,442 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.63   0.47 0.63   0.47 0.63 
         This table reports the results of sub-sample analysis by legal regimes for the IFRS adoption. The dependent variable is LIQ 
(non-zero return proportion). In Panel A, the sample is split based on legal origin. In Panel B, the sample is split based on anti-
self-dealing index (ANTI). The High ANTI and Low ANTI sub-samples consist of firms from countries with anti-self-dealing 
index that are above and below the median ANTI, respectively. The dependent variable is LIQ (stock liquidity). WAL1, WAL2, 
and WAL3 are the three different measures of asset liquidity. The firm-specific control variables included in the regression are 
MV, BM, PRICE, LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, ROA, and BHAR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
POSTIFRS is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for post-IFRS adoption firm-year observations and 0 otherwise. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NObs is the number of observations. To conserve space, the 
coefficient estimates for the Intercept term, firm-specific control variables, and Country (C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) fixed-
effects are not reported. Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the firm and year level are reported in parentheses. 
Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 8 
Robustness Check – Sub-sample by Legal Regimes 
LIQi = α0 + β1WALi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
Panel A:  Sub-sample by Legal Origin 
Variables Civil Law Common Law 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
  LIQ LIQ 
 
LIQ LIQ 
 
LIQ LIQ 
WAL1 3.754 2.075 
      
 
(5.03) (5.09) 
      WAL2 
   
5.179 2.479 
   
    
(8.35) (6.30) 
   WAL3 
      
3.225 1.901 
       
(6.84) (5.93) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 71,041 56,941 
 
71,041 56,941 
 
71,041 56,941 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.55   0.41 0.55   0.41 0.55 
Δ WAL Coefficient -1.679 
 
-2.701 
 
-1.324 
(t-statistics) (-2.02)   (-3.76)   (-2.24) 
         Panel B:  Sub-sample by Anti-Self Dealing Index (ANTI) 
Variables Low ANTI High ANTI 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
  LIQ LIQ 
 
LIQ LIQ 
 
LIQ LIQ 
WAL1 4.809 1.788 
      
 
(4.04) (4.47) 
      WAL2 
   
6.906 2.520 
   
    
(6.63) (6.86) 
   WAL3 
      
4.476 1.898 
       
(6.39) (6.15) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 25,301 102,681 
 
25,301 102,681 
 
25,301 102,681 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.49   0.44 0.49   0.44 0.49 
Δ WAL Coefficient -3.021 
 
-4.386 
 
-2.578 
(t-statistics) (-2.43)   (-4.03)   (-3.14) 
         This table reports the results of sub-sample analysis by legal regimes. In Panel A, the sample is split based on legal origins. In Panel B, the 
sample is split based on the anti-self-dealing index (ANTI). The High ANTI and Low ANTI sub-samples consist of firms from countries with anti-
self-dealing index that are above and below the median ANTI, respectively. The dependent variable is LIQ (stock liquidity). WAL1, WAL2, and 
WAL3 are the three different measures of asset liquidity. The firm-specific control variables included in the regression are MV, BM, PRICE, 
LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, ROA, and BHAR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NObs is the number of observations. To conserve space, the coefficient estimates for the Intercept 
term, firm-specific control variables, and Country (C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) fixed-effects are not reported. Robust t-statistics based on two-
way clustered at the firm and year level are reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 9 
Robustness Tests - Bid-Ask Spread 
lnBASi = α0 + β1WALi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
lnBASi = α0 + β1WALi + β2POSTIFRSi*WALi + β3POSTIFRSi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
Panel A: Asset Liquidity on Stock Liquidity 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 
      lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS         
WAL1 -0.135 
       
 
(-3.48) 
       WAL2 
 
-0.197 
      
  
(-5.96) 
      WAL3 
   
-0.155 
    
    
(-6.60) 
    Firm Controls Yes Yes 
      Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
      
NObs 91,251 91,251 
 
91,251 
    Adjusted R2 0.76 0.77   0.77         
Panel B: Asset Liquidity on Stock Liquidity - ACCSTD Subsample Analysis 
Variables 
Low 
ACCSTD 
High 
ACCSTD 
 
Low 
ACCSTD 
High 
ACCSTD 
 
Low 
ACCSTD 
High 
ACCSTD 
  lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS lnBAS 
WAL1 -0.146 -0.156 
      
 
(-2.89) (-3.02) 
      WAL2 
   
-0.269 -0.202 
   
    
(-5.05) (-4.76) 
   WAL3 
      
-0.195 -0.172 
       
(-4.50) (-5.35) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 21,542 58,406 
 
21,542 58,406 
 
21,542 58,406 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.76   0.67 0.76   0.67 0.76 
Δ WAL 
Coefficient -0.01 
 
0.07 
 
0.03 
(t-statistics) (-0.18)   (-1.24)   -0.62 
Panel C: Impact of IFRS on Asset-Stock Liquidity Relationship 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    Variables lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS         
WAL1 -0.024 
       
 
(-0.52) 
       WAL2 
 
-0.233 
      
  
(-4.75) 
      WAL3 
   
-0.262 
    
    
(-6.22) 
    POSTIFRS*WAL -0.134 -0.022 
 
0.085 
    
 
(-2.47) (-0.40) 
 
(1.91) 
    POSTIFRS -0.086 -0.102 
 
-0.166 
    
 
(-2.65) (-2.49) 
 
(-3.18) 
    Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
    Fixed Effects Firm C, I, Y 
 
Firm 
    
NObs 31,292 31,292 
 
31,292 
    Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71   0.71         
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Panel D: Impact of IFRS  - Subsample Analysis by Legal Origin 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
 
Civil Law Common Law 
Variables lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS lnBAS 
WAL1 0.022 -0.168 
      
 
(0.37) (-2.34) 
      WAL2 
   
-0.185 -0.357 
   
    
(-3.38) (-5.21) 
   WAL3 
      
-0.210 -0.349 
       
(-4.65) (-5.93) 
POSTIFRS*WAL -0.227 0.084 
 
-0.101 0.194 
 
0.041 0.206 
 
(-3.76) (0.92) 
 
(-1.86) (2.10) 
 
(0.86) (2.59) 
POSTIFRS 0.038 0.001 
 
0.040 -0.057 
 
-0.029 -0.117 
 
(2.53) (0.02) 
 
(1.69) (-0.78) 
 
(-0.85) (-1.35) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 21,127 10,165 
 
21,127 10,165 
 
21,127 10,165 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73   0.71 0.73   0.71 0.73 
         Panel E: Impact of IFRS  - Subsample Analysis by Anti-self-dealing Index 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
 
Low ANTI High ANTI 
Variables lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS lnBAS   lnBAS lnBAS 
WAL1 0.044 -0.179 
      
 
(0.67) (-2.94) 
      WAL2 
   
-0.178 -0.349 
   
    
(-2.93) (-5.71) 
   WAL3 
      
-0.215 -0.334 
       
(-4.34) (-6.07) 
POSTIFRS*WAL -0.287 0.095 
 
-0.139 0.179 
 
0.032 0.197 
 
(-4.38) (1.33) 
 
(-2.48) (2.29) 
 
(0.65) (2.80) 
POSTIFRS 0.041 -0.108 
 
0.048 -0.159 
 
-0.031 -0.220 
 
(2.75) (-1.88) 
 
(1.86) (-2.50) 
 
(-0.83) (-2.87) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 18,467 12,825 
 
18,467 12,825 
 
18,467 12,825 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73   0.71 0.73   0.71 0.74 
         This table reports the further results of asset-stock liquidity relationship using bid-ask spread (lnBAS) as a measure of stock 
liquidity. In Panel A, the results for full sample analysis using lnBAS is reported. In Panel B, the results for ACCSTD sub-
sample is reported. In Panel C, the results for the impact of IFRS adoption on asset-stock liquidity relationship is reported. In 
Panel D, the sample is split based on legal origin for the IFRS adoption analysis. In Panel E, the sample is split based on anti-
self-dealing index (ANTI) for the IFRS adoption analysis. The High ANTI and Low ANTI sub-samples consist of firms from 
countries with anti-self-dealing index that are above and below the median ANTI, respectively. WAL1, WAL2, and WAL3 are the 
three different measures of asset liquidity. The firm-specific control variables included in the regression are MV, BM, PRICE, 
LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, ROA, and BHAR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. POSTIFRS is an 
indicator variable that is equal to 1 for post-IFRS adoption firm-year observations and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NObs is the number of observations. To conserve space, the coefficient estimates for 
the Intercept term, firm-specific control variables, and Country (C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) fixed-effects are not reported. 
Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the firm and year level are reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-
2010. 
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Table 10 
Comparing Different Asset Classes' Relation with Stock Liquidity 
LIQi or lnBASi = α0 + β1WALi + β2NONCASH-CAi + β3FIXEDASSETSi + β4INTANGIBLEi + γjControlsi + 
θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
Panel A: Full Sample Analysis 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Variables LIQ LIQ   lnBAS lnBAS 
      WAL1(CASH) 2.502 2.736 
 
-0.151 -0.165 
 
(5.94) (6.19) 
 
(-4.00) (-3.92) 
NONCASH-CA 2.446 2.539 
 
-0.168 -0.176 
 
(5.41) (5.92) 
 
(-7.04) (-7.47) 
FIXED ASSETS -0.990 -0.630 
 
0.024 0.001 
 
(-1.88) (-1.27) 
 
(1.13) (0.07) 
INTANGIBLE 
 
3.252 
  
-0.179 
 
 
(6.74) 
  
(-5.60) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 119,735  119,735  
 
87,799  87,799  
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.47   0.76 0.77 
      Panel B: Subsample Analysis by Accounting Standards 
 Low ACCSTD High ACCSTD 
 
Low ACCSTD High ACCSTD 
Variables LIQ LIQ   lnBAS lnBAS 
WAL1(CASH) 6.225 1.615 
 
-0.186 -0.195 
 
(5.23) (2.70) 
 
(-3.47) (-3.34) 
NONCASH-CA 2.590 3.555 
 
-0.228 -0.169 
 
(2.86) (6.67) 
 
(-4.83) (-6.05) 
FIXED ASSETS -0.863 -0.386 
 
0.043 -0.046 
 
(-0.90) (-0.55) 
 
(1.41) (-1.32) 
INTANGIBLE 5.493 2.371 
 
-0.165 -0.169 
 
(4.63) (4.71) 
 
(-3.22) (-4.24) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 28,589 79,172 
 
21,116 55,460 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.50   0.67 0.76 
Δ WAL1 Coef. -4.610 
 
-0.010 
(t-statistics) (-3.31) 
 
(-0.13) 
Δ NONCASH-CA Coef. 0.965 
 
0.059 
(t-statistics) (0.87) 
 
(1.04) 
Δ FIXED ASSETS Coef. 0.478 
 
-0.089 
(t-statistics) (0.38) 
 
(-1.85) 
Δ INTANGIBLE Coef. -3.122 
 
-0.004 
(t-statistics) (-2.52)   (-0.06) 
      This table reports the results of our multivariate regression of stock liquidity on the firm’s four different asset classes. In 
Panel A, a full sample analysis is performed. In Panel B, the sample is split into Low ACCSTD and High ACCSTD sub-
samples. The High ACCSTD sub-sample consists of firms from countries with accounting standards index that is above the 
median; while the Low ACCSTD sub-sample consists of firms from countries with accounting standards index that is below 
the median. The dependent variable is either LIQ (non-zero return proportion) or lnBAS (bid-ask spread). WAL1 is equal to 
cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged value of Total Assets. NONCASH-CA is equal to total Current Assets minus 
Cash divided by lagged value of Total Assets. FIXED ASSETS is equal to total fixed assets divided by lagged value of Total 
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Assets. INTANGIBLE is equal to net intangible assets divided by lagged value of Total Assets. The firm-specific control 
variables included in the regression are MV, BM, PRICE, LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, ROA, and BHAR. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. ΔWAL1 Coefficient is equal to the difference in WAL1 coefficient estimates for 
the High ACCSTD and Low ACCSTD sub-samples. ΔNONCASH-CA, ΔFIXEDASSETS, and ΔINTANGIBLE are defined 
similarly. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NObs is the number of observations. To 
conserve space, the coefficient estimates for the Intercept term, firm-specific control variables, and Country (C), Industry 
(I), and Year (Y) fixed-effects are not reported. Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the firm and year level are 
reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
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Table 11 
Asset-Stock liquidity Relations for Financially Constraint Firms 
LIQi = α0 + β1WAL1i + β2WAL1i*FINCONi + β3NONCASH-CAi + β4NONCASH-CA*FINCONi + 
β5FIXEDASSETSi + β6FIXEDASSETSi*FINCONi  + β7INTANGIBLEi + β8INTANGIBLEi*FINCONi + 
β9FINCONi + γjControlsi + θkFixed-Effectsi + εi 
  Model 1 (KZ) Model 2 (WW)   Model 3 (KZ) Model 4 (WW) 
Variables LIQ LIQ   lnBAS lnBAS 
      WAL1 (CASH) 2.757 16.311 
 
-0.208 -0.542 
 
(5.06) (6.26) 
 
(-4.15) (-3.77) 
WAL1*FINCON 0.529 24.025 
 
-0.057 -0.621 
 
(2.13) (5.49) 
 
(-5.83) (-2.66) 
NONCASH-CA 3.199 -7.599 
 
-0.186 -0.441 
 
(7.00) (-2.98) 
 
(-7.93) (-2.90) 
NONCASH-CA*FINCON 0.175 -18.380 
 
-0.012 -0.466 
 
(0.76) (-4.22) 
 
(-0.94) (-1.84) 
FIXED ASSETS -0.317 -3.573 
 
-0.007 -0.564 
 
(-0.63) (-1.32) 
 
(-0.35) (-5.88) 
FIXED ASSETS*FINCON 0.017 -5.299 
 
-0.020 -0.939 
 
(0.08) (-1.21) 
 
(-1.53) (-6.14) 
INTANGIBLE 3.407 7.304 
 
-0.200 1.044 
 
(6.81) (1.35) 
 
(-6.35) (7.47) 
INTANGIBLE*FINCON 0.235 6.563 
 
-0.031 1.995 
 
(0.87) (0.77) 
 
(-2.67) (8.27) 
FINCON -0.733 5.308 
 
0.046 0.677 
 
(-4.18) (1.29) 
 
(5.12) (3.01) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y 
 
C, I, Y C, I, Y 
NObs 111,354  111,096  
 
79,772  78,877  
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.48   0.74 0.74 
      This table reports the effects of Financial Constraint on different asset classes on stock liquidity. The dependent variable is 
LIQ (non-zero proportion) or lnBAS (bid-ask spread). WAL1 is equal to cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged value 
of Total Assets. NONCASH-CA is equal to total Current Assets minus Cash divided by lagged value of Total Assets. 
FIXED ASSETS is equal to total fixed assets divided by lagged value of Total Assets.  INTANGIBLE is equal to net 
intangible assets divided by lagged value of Total Assets. Two measures of financial constraint (FINCON) are used: (1) 
Model 1 and 3 report the results using KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) as the measure of financial constraint; (2) 
Model 2 and 4 report the results using WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006) as the measure of financial constraint. The firm-
specific control variables included in the regression are MV, BM, PRICE, LEVERAGE, ACCRUAL, RETVOL, CAPEX, 
ROA, and BHAR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. NObs is the number of observations. To conserve space, the coefficient estimates for the Intercept term, and 
Country (C), Industry (I), and Year (Y) fixed-effects are not reported. Robust t-statistics based on two-way clustered at the 
firm and year level are reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1996-2010. 
 
 
